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To Delegate Or Not To Delegate-That Is Preemption: The
Lack Of Political Accountability In Administrative




When unelected bureaucrats in administrative agencies exercise their delegated
powers to preempt state laws that protect individual rights and liberties, this action
poses a problem of constitutional dimensions. Congress primarily derives the
authority to enact preemptive legislation from its enumerated power under the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution.' Then, by applying preemption within our
federalist system, the federal government can usurp state autonomy by displacing
state laws.2 In this way preemption has a direct impact on the federal-state balance
of power, and, therefore, federalism restraints inherent within the structure of the
federal government are particularly applicable in that area.
When congressional action, undertaken pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
threatens to infringe upon state sovereignty, the states' interests in preserving the
individual liberties of their citizens are enforced through the procedural safeguards
embodied in the political process and exercised when voters disfavor elected
representatives responsible for unfavorable legislation.4 Through this mechanism, the
states retain a voice in congressional lawmaking5
However, in certain situations, specifically when Congress delegates preemptive
power to unelected and unaccountable agency staffers, this federalism restraint is in
danger of being overlooked.6 Within this context, it is difficult for voters to locate a
politically sensitive representative, and the built-in checks on the federal system are
unable to function properly This type of deficiency in our constitutional structure
necessitates that congressional delegations of preemptive authority to administrative
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 1998; B.A., University of
Washington, 1994. 1 would like to thank Professor Tim Hurley for his invaluable comments and Professor Leslie
Jacobs for her helpful suggestions.
1. See itfra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (explaining that the Commerce Clause is the primary
source of congressional authority for federal statutes that preempt state laws).
2. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of preemption).
3. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (describing the federalism restraints applicable in the area
of preemption).
4. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing the restraints on federal government action).
5. See hifra notes 97-98, 195-98 and accompanying text (explaining the states' role in the political process).
6. See infra notes 106, 206-08 and accompanying text (explaining that within the administrative pre-
emption context, the political process is unable to function properly).'
7. See hifra notes 282-315 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in locating a politically
accountable decision-maker when Congress delegates preemptive authority to administrative agencies).
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agencies should be scrutinized with the utmost precaution to prevent the subversion
of federalism principles and individual rights. Because, inevitably, administrative
preemption can detrimentally affect the individual rights of the American people,
precisely those whom both the state and federal government should protect.
An illustrative example of the individual liberties at stake, and the potential
dangers that exist when delegated preemptive power goes unchecked by the con-
stituency, is epitomized by the recent controversy surrounding the Federal Medical
Device Amendment's (MDA)8 preemptive effects on state tort laws?
1
8. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a) (West 1996). This provision preempts state requirements with regard to medical
devices when the state requirements differ from or add to a previously established Federal Food and Drug
Administration requirement and are associated with the safety of the regulated medical device. Id.
9. Before the Supreme Court decision in Medironic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996), courts had held
with near uniformity that the Medical Device Amendments preempted at least some of the state common law tort
claims that injured consumers could bring against device manufacturers. See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing
Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d 39,42 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a heart pacemaker, for products
liability and breach of warranty, were preempted by the MDA), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 116
S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1278 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims,
involving an anti-wrinkle skin implant, for strict liability, negligence, mislabeling, fraud, and implied warranty,
were preempted by the MDA), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); English v.
Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477,483 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a penile implant, for strict
products liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty, were preempted by the MDA), vacated and
remandedfor reconsideration, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 20-21 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving an intraocular lens, for defective design, defective manufacture,
failure to warn, and failure to test, were preempted by the MDA); Duvall v. Bristol-Meyers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d
392,401 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a penile implant, for defective design, defective
manufacture, failure to warn, implied warranties of merchantability, and negligent design, manufacture, marketing,
testing, and promotion, were all preempted by the MDA), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 116 S. Ct.
2575 (1996); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (1 th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims, invol-
ving a heart pacemaker, for negligent manufacture and negligent failure to warn, were preempted by the MDA),
vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1336 (3d
Cir.) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a replacement heart valve, for negligence, strict liability, breach of
implied warranties, and fraud on the FDA, were preempted by the MDA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Reeves
v. Acromed Corp., 44 F.3d 300,307 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a metal bone implant
in the spine, for failure to warn, were preempted by the MDA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995); Martello v.
Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167,1169 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a contact lens
disinfectant system, for products liability, were preempted by the MDA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Gile
v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 545 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving an intraocular
lens, for products liability and negligence, were preempted by the MDA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994);
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18-19 (ist Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving a heart
pacemaker, for breach of implied warranty, negligent failure to warn, and negligent manufacture, were preempted
by the MDA); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1425 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff's claims,
involving an anti-wrinkle skin implant, for defective design, inadequate warning, and negligent failure to warn,
were preempted by the MDA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 86 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139 (1st
Cir.) (holding that plaintiff's claims, involving an anti-wrinkle skin implant, for failure to warn and that defendant
fraudulently obtained FDA approval of the product and labeling, were preempted by the MDA), cert. denied, 114
S. CL 84 (1993). But see Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
MDA does not preempt any common law claims against makers of anti-wrinkle skin implant). Although the Court
in Medtronic held that state common law tort claims were not preempted by the MDA, that decision has not
precluded other courts from finding that some common law tort claims are still preempted by the MDA. See, e.g.,
Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that failure to warn claim was preempted by the
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In 1988, Eunice Beavers died while undergoing an angioplasty procedure when
a heart catheter failed to deflate after being inserted into one of her coronary
arteries.' ° When Mrs. Beavers's survivors sued the manufacturer, C.R. Bard, Inc., for
wrongful death, alleging several tort claims, the First Circuit ruled that the 1976
Medical Device Amendments preempted all state tort claims and dismissed the
complaint."
The Talbott court relied heavily upon the Federal Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's (FDA) interpretation of the MDA in concluding that Congress intended the
MDA to preempt state common law tort claims. 2 The court felt compelled to
effectuate what it believed was the "clearly expressed" intent of Congress that the
"public interest will be best served by relying exclusively on the FDA to strike the
proper balance between reasonably assuring safety and promoting innovation with
regard to new devices that have the potential both to enhance and injure human
health."' 13 However, in that case, the FDA did not tip the scale in favor of Mrs.
Beavers' family, so recovery was denied.'
4
Other circuits, including the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, had also addressed the
issue of the preemptive scope of the MDA on state tort law and had come to different
results than the First Circuit in Talbott, some courts preempting claims and others
finding no preemption.' s Yet, the simple fact remains that the FDA's interpretation
and recommendations as to the preemptive effects of the MDA have deprived many
people of the opportunity to recover for serious injuries. 6
The Supreme Court, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 17finally resolved the split among
the federal circuits on the extent to which the MDA preempts state tort claims. 8 The
Court in Medtronic held that defective design, manufacturing, and warning claims,
were not preempted under the MDA.19 However, this decision was based on the
Court's statutory interpretation of the MDA, that Congress had really not intended
MDA); Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 181 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding the state common law claims of
negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranty were preempted by the MDA).
10. Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25,26 (lst Cir. 1995).
11. Id. at 26-27.
12. See id. at 30 (stating that "the FDA is in the best position to determine whether the provisions of the
MDA have in fact been violated").
13. Id.
14. See id. at 31 (affirming the district court's dismissal of Eunice Beavers' heirs' lawsuit).
15. Compare Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (1lth Cir. 1995) (relying on the FDA regulations
to hold that the MDA preempted some common law claims but failed to preempt others) with Kennedy v. Collagen
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453. 1459 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA did not preempt state common law claims).
16. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (illustrating examples of state tort claims that were
preempted by the MDA).
17. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
18. See id. at 2259 (concluding that no common law tort claims were preempted under the MDA).
19. Id. at 2258.
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to preempt existing state tort law.0 The Court, in sharp contrast to the FDA, con-
cluded that the MDA did not preempt state tort law.2'
This situation, involving the FDA's broad discretion to preempt state laws and
have a detrimental impact on citizens, illustrates the danger of the power wielded by
administrative agencies in the preemption context.22 Although the Supreme Court in
Medtronic resolved the controversy in favor of providing a remedy for state tort
claims?3 an overriding problem was not addressed: the extent to which unaccount-
able administrative decision-makers are able to usurp state protection of individual
rights.24 The decision in Medtronic did not answer this broader question of whether
agency staffers, who are not politically accountable, and who are insulated from the
procedural safeguards of federalism, should have broad authority to exercise the
preemptive power that the Constitution grants to Congress.
This Comment addresses the problems that exist when administrative agencies,
staffed with unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats, preempt state law while side-
stepping the procedural safeguards implicit in our federal system.25 Specifically, this
Comment points out that one of the main reasons administrative preemption is able
to avoid federalism restraints is because Congress blurs its own responsibility for
controversial lawmaking by delegating this responsibility away? 6 This practice,
which manipulates voter perception of governmental accountability, coupled with
inadequate congressional oversight of administrative rule-making, illustrates the
absence of an effective mechanism for imposing accountability upon elected law-
makers.27 Therefore, agency officials promulgate powerful regulations without
subjecting themselves to political repercussions.8 Thus, the federal system is sub-
verted and congressional delegations of preemptive authority lack the political and
procedural checks that legitimize this type of administrative lawmaking? 9
Part II of this Comment examines the preemption doctrine established by the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause and exercised through Congress's Commerce
Clause power.30 In Part III, this Comment provides an overview of federalism and
the mechanisms implicit within the federal system that protect state sovereignty?'
Next, Part IV focuses on the nondelegation doctrine, both the historical limits
20. Id. at 2257-58.
21. Id. at 2258.
22. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing the preemptive effect of the MDA on state tort
claims).
23. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
24. See discussion infra Part VI. (examining the need for politically accountable decision-makers in the
context of administrative preemption).
25. See infra notes 187-315 and accompanying text.
26. See discussion infra Part VLC.
27. See discussion infra Part VLC.
28. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
29. See discussion infra Part VII.
30. See discussion infra Part II.
31. See discussion infra Part M.
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restraining congressional delegation and the reemergence of those limitations in
opinions of the Court.32 Part V of this Comment describes the protections available
through the federal system when accountable decision-makers preempt state laws.
33
Part VI explains the importance of having politically accountable decision-makers,
and demonstrates that congressional oversight of administrative rule-making is not
a sufficient tool for making elected officials in Congress accountable for agency
actionsM Finally, this Comment concludes that in light of Congress's hidden
agendas, which are epitomized when it tries to blur its ownaccountability through
delegation and then fails to provide sufficient oversight of rule-making, there is no
accountability in administrative preemption and the political processes cannot restore
the proper balance between state and federal authority.35 Thus, delegation of pre-
emptive power to administrative agencies should be carefully scrutinized or
proscribed unless there is a means of holding a political body responsible to the
American People for preemptive decisions.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
A. The Constitutional Foundations for the Preemption Doctrine
The foundation of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which gave rise to
the doctrine of preemption, was colored by the concerns of the Framers that the
Constitution would strike an unworkable balance between federal and state
interests.36 The power of federal law to displace state law commanded the attention
of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, who finally settled on a
proposal weighing in favor of small state interests at the expense of an overreaching
federal government.37 The Framers arrived at a carefully derived compromise bet-
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. See discussion infra Part V.
34. See discussion infra Part VI.
35. See discussion infra Part VII.
36. Kenneth Starr et al., The Law of Preemption, 1991 A.B.A. SEc. OF ANITRUSTL 6 (report of the United
States Appellate Judges Conference synthesizing the law concerning federal preemption of state law) (recounting
discussions by the Founders concerning different proposals for the Supremacy Clause and their impact on the
federal-state balance of power).
37. Id. at 8. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Framers debated two proposals for the Supremacy
Clause. I TUB RECODS OFTHE CONVETIMON OF 1787, at 160 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter Farrand]
(records of June 7, 1787). The "Virginia Plan" included the power to "negative" all laws passed by the states
contravening, in the opinion of the National Legislature, the articles of the Union. This plan was crafted by James
Madison and represented a powerful federal government with broad powers over the states. Id. at 20-23 (records
of May 29, 1787). The "New Jersey Plan" set forth "that all Acts of the United States shall be the supreme law of
the respective states." It was introduced by William Paterson, a proponent for the smaller states, and was a far less
expansive version of the Supremacy Clause than the Virginia Plan. Id. at 245 (records of June 15, 1787). The
Convention adopted the New Jersey proposal on July 17, 1787, and this small states' plan without the congressional
"negative" provision was enshrined in Article VI of the Constitution after several changes. 2 Farrand, at 28 (records
of July 17, 1787).
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ween the goals of nationally uniform laws and the particular needs of individual
states.38 This balance was realized by vesting supreme legislative power in a
representative Congress by means of the Supremacy Clause which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the" Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding?9
Because the Framers understood that of the three branches of government the
Congress alone represents the states as states, the Framers gave the Congress the
authority and responsibility to balance federal and state power by choosing whether
to preempt state laws with federal legislation.4
Congress exercises its authority to create federal law that supersedes state law
pursuant to its constitutionally enumerated powers.4 ' The power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause42 has been the primary foundation supporting the creation of
federal statutes that preempt state and local laws under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.43 Due to the expansive interpretation of the federal commerce power
prevailing since United States v. Darby,44 Congress's commerce clause power
38. Starr et al., supra note 36, at 6-8; see Paula A. Sinozich et al., Project: The Role of Preemption In
Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 107, 111 (1993) (stating that, although the Framers understood that
supreme federal power was essential to a coherent national government, they were concerned with the preservation
of state autonomy).
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV.
1429, 1432-33 (1984) (describing Congress's unique role among the three branches of government as the repre-
sentative of the states as states, and therefore concluding it is the best suited body of government to balance the
competing interests of federal power and states' rights); see THE FEDERALIsTNo. 58, at 389 (J. Madison) (B. Wright
ed. 1961) ("one branch of the legislature is a representation of citizens, the other of the states .... ); JESSE CHOPER,
JuDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrTICAL PRocEss 176-79 (1980). Choper expounds that numerous
structural aspects of the national political system safeguard states' rights and individual autonomy. Id. at 176.
Specifically, Choper illustrates that "the Senate - a body 'in which the smallest state has as much weight as the
greatest'-was originally intended to be a national legislative guardian against usurpation of state interests." Id.
Although this may not carry the same force as in the past when senators were elected by the state legislatures, the
popularly elected House of Representatives has a state-related base and therefore is still a mechanism for state
representation. Id. at 177. In addition, Choper concludes that the demographics of Congress and the backgrounds
of its members, which usually includes service in state and municipal offices, ensure their concern with state and
local issues. Id. at 178-79.
41. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 69, 90-91
(1988).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .. ").
43. Russell Chapin, Harmonizing Federal Preemption Doctrine with Garcia's Cession of State and Local
Interests to the Political Process, 23 URB. LAW. 45,45-46 (1991).
44. 312 U.S. 100(1941).
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presents a potent tool within the preemption context.4' Within recent years, the courts
have shown a great reluctance to strike down any exercise of Congress's commerce
power as being beyond its enumerated powers,6 Thus, the preemption doctrine
today, under the enumerated-power lines set forth in Article I, Section 8, poses
practically no limits at all on Congress's ability to effectuate preemptiye federal
legislation.47
B. The Development of the Doctrine of Preemption
Preemption is deeply rooted in the decisional law of the United States, beginning
with the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden." In Gibbons, the rights of steamboats
to navigate the waters of New York presented a conflict between a federal license
granted under the authority of an Act of Congress and a state monopoly conferred
upon a single steamboat operator, Aaron Ogden. 49 In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme
Court first resolved this tension between state and federal legislation.-,° Chief Justice
Marshall articulated the Court's reasoning in the initial statement of the preemption
doctrine:
Since ... the States may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which
depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress
passed in pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter upon the
inquiry, whether the laws of New York, as expounded by the highest
tribunal of that State, have, in their application to this case, come into
collision with an act of Congress .... Should this collision exist, it will be
immaterial whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,"
or, in virtue of a power to regulate their own domestic trade and police. In
one case and the other, the acts of New York must yield to the law of
51
congress ....
45. See id. at 114 (expanding the scope of Congress's commerce power so that Congress is free to impose
whatever conditions it wishes upon the privileges of engaging in an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce, so long as the conditions themselves violate no independent constitutional right); see also Wolfsn,
supra note 41, at 91. But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,1631-32 (1995) (invalidating a federal statute
prohibiting guns in a school zone as beyond Congress's commerce clause power).
46. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 91.
47. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 91.
48. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
49. Id. at 1-2.
50. Id. at 209-10.
51. Id.
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Marshall's approach focused on whether there was a "collision" between state and
federal authority. 2 This was the original application of the preemption rubric;
however, due to an expanding centralized government, the doctrine has developed
into its more complex, modem form.
53
The Supreme Court has upheld the proposition that the determination as to
whether a federal statute preempts state law is entirely a question of congressional
intent.54 The intent may be expressly stated55 or implied in the federal statute.
56
Express preemption results when Congress directs in the language of the statute its
explicit intention to supersede state legislation.57 The use of express language to
preempt state law is the clearest example of preemption because there is no
interpretive difficulty in defining Congress's purpose.58
The more difficult cases emerge when there is no clear statement of intent to
displace state law. However, even in the absence of an express statutory provision,
the courts will imply preemption in three circumstances: First, when Congress passes
legislation that is so comprehensive that it occupies a particular field, leaving no
room for supplementary state legislation;59 second, when the federal interest pre-
dominates the state interest to such a degree that it prevents the enforcement of state
52. IA.; see Starr et al., supra note 36, at 9 (articulating that a collision existed because Gibbons, the federal
licensee, was being excluded from navigating the New York waters by the state monopoly conferred upon Aaron
Ogden).
53. Starr et al., supra note 36, at 14. Relatively few preemption cases invoke express provisions or actual
conflicts of the Gibbons's variety. Id. Supremacy Clause cases more often involve preemption based on
comprehensive federal regulations, the nature of the regulated subject matter, the impact of state law on federal
purposes, and, in the cases of preemption by administrative agencies, the scope of authority delegated to an agency
by Congress. Id. at 14-15.
54. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96,103 (1963) ("The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touch-
stone" of preemption.). The Supreme Court has continually reiterated the principle that the purpose of Congress
is the "ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963) ("[W]e are not to conclude that
Congress legislated the ouster of this [state] statute.., in the absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate
to that effect.").
55. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,713 (1985) ("[W]hen acting
within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms.").
56. See id. ("In the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress's intent to pre-empt... state law
... may be inferred ....").
57. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658,663-64 (1993).
58. Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872,875 (8th Cir. 1993). Express preemption by a congressional provision
must "focus on the plain wording of the [provision], which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress's
[affirmative] preemptive intent." CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. at 664; see Paul Megreal, Some Rice with Your
Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 823, 831 (1995)
(stating that express intent poses the simplest case for preemption because Congress has explicitly directed that state
law is preempted).
59. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713; see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (finding state law is preempted
if the federal law "so thoroughly occupies a legislative field" that Congress allowed no additional room to regulate);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983)
(explaining that congressional intent to supersede state law may be inferred from a federal regulatory scheme that
leaves no room to supplement it).
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laws;6° and, finally, when a direct conflict exists between the federal statute and state
law, making it impossible to comply with both.6'
Although preemption, simply stated, prevents a state from enforcing its own
laws, the preemption cases do not indicate the extensive implications of the doctrine
on "the very structure of federalism established by the Constitution.'" 2 Courts
continually dictate the notion that preemption cases are decided solely by the intent
of Congress.6 Commentators attempt to assure us that preemption cases "may pose
complex questions of statutory construction, but raise no controversial issues of
power."" Yet preemption does raise controversial issues of power because not only
was it born amidst a highly debated struggle between a large national government
and state autonomy, 6 but within our complex constitutional framework, it sometimes
threatens to undermine the political safeguards of federalism.6
III. FEDERALISM
The values of federalism are recognized through many sources of law and are
deeply rooted in the foundation of our republican form of government. Upon the
creation of our governmental structure, the Framers were not anticipating multiple
clashes as a result of having federal and state power operate concurrently.6 Instead,
the federal government was limited to the powers specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, while state power extended to subjects proper for local government
60. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230,
rev'd sub nom. Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947)).
61. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713; see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43
(finding that implied preemption occurs when state law conflicts and frustrates the purpose and goals of the federal
law).
62. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 88.
63. Id.; see, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1987) (stating that the preemption
doctrine focuses on congressional intent); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985)
("In deciding whether a federal law preempts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress's intent in enacting
the federal statute at issue."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (pointing to congressional
intent to occupy a given field, and state law conflicts with federal law, as two general ways to preempt state law).
64. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 88 (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe as stating that as long as Congress
acts within an area delegated to it, preemption cases are based solely on statutory construction and flow directly
from a substantive source of congressional power coupled with the Supremacy Clause).
65. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 5-8 (articulating the debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1787
between those favoring a Supremacy Clause granting large national government the power to "negative" state law
and those representatives of smaller states seeking to protect state autonomy with a more restrictive version of the
Supremacy Clause).
66. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (explaining that the safeguards of the federal system are
unable to function effectively within the context of administrative preemption).
67. See generally Rex E. Lee, Federalsn, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy ofGarcia, 1996 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 329 (1996) (describing the division of governmental authority under the Constitution); Starr et al., supra
note 36, at 43 (explaining that the Constitution is the most direct source of law that recognizes the continued
importance of federalism values).
68. Wolfson, supra note 41. at 92.
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regulation, such as matters of health, safety, morals, and welfare.69 In The Federalist,
some of the Framers suggested that state and federal authority would not likely
conflict, but instead each would operate separate and distinct from one another?'
In contrast to state power, while the reach of federal authority may only extend
to those powers enumerated in the Constitution, federal authority has a preemptive
effect on conflicting state laws.7' Throughout American history legislative instru-
ments such as the Commerce,7 Taxing,73 and Spending74 Clauses have acted to
expand federal power while decreasing the areas in which states can govern."5 But,
the Framers, in creating our federalist system, did not intend the federal government
to have unbridled authority to usurp state autonomy.76 These limitations are
evidenced in the constitutional design of our national government that expressly pro-
vides that states are also vested with established powers.' The Constitution directly
affirms the states as the source of its development; the states not only were the forum
for the adoption of the Constitution, but remain integral today in deliberating over
constitutional amendments and numerous aspects of influence in the political pro-
69. Lee, supra note 67, at 335.
70. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 92; see THEFEDERALTSTNo. 32, supra note 40, at 241 (A. Hamilton) ("[A]s
the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the
United States."); id. No. 41 at 293 (J. Madison) ("The Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered
under two general points of view. The first relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government,
including the restraints imposed on the States."); id. No. 46 at 330 (J. Madison) ("The federal and state governments
are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for
different purposes.").
71. Lee, supra note 67, at 335.
72. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113-15, 118-29 (1942) (upholding Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate the production of wheat that is never shipped from the grower's farm); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1937) (sustaining Congress's power to regulate, through the
National Labor Relations Act, labor relations that affect interstate commerce). But see Printz v. United States, 117
S. CL 2365, 2384 (1997) (limiting the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power by concluding that Congress
cannot order state officials to conduct background checks pursuant to the Brody Act); United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30, 1634 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zone Act exceeded the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause power because the possession of a firearm in or near a school does not "substantially affect"
interstate commerce).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (holding that Congress has the authority under
the Taxing Clause to implement a ten percent tax on gambling wagers and that all those persons engaged in
wagering must report with the Internal Revenue Service); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (holding
that Congress has the power to implement a yearly license tax on dealers in firearms under the Taxing Power).
74. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress has the power to make
federal highway funds to the states contingent on the states passing a minimum drinking age of twenty.one years
as appropriate under the spending clause); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (holding that
provisions of the Social Security Act that pressured states to implement unemployment compensation were an
appropriate exercise of the spending power).
75. Lee, supra note 67, at 336.
76. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 43 (stating that the Constitution affirms the states as integral parts of
the national system).
77. Starr et al., supra note 36, at 43.
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cess 78 In particular, the Tenth Amendment recognizes the importance of state
government and federalism principles. 9 It directs that "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 8 Other provisions dictate the
importance of the states' ability to control aspects of the country's affairs: those
limiting congressional power,8 limiting state participation in decidedly national regu-
lation;82 and directing the way states affect the rights, duties, and livelihood of their
citizens. 3
In order for preemption to serve the goals of federalism, "it should secure to both
the federal government and the states the right to regulate in their proper fields of
authority."' Where both Congress and the states act legitimately, there are several
aspects of federalism illustrating the importance of its place in our system of govern-
ment.8 States are able to control the fundamental liberties and rights of their citizens
by exercising power over political factions and movements that might advocate an
overreaching centralized government.8 The states can also serve as a laboratory for
novel social and economic innovations, while avoiding any risk to the rest of the
country.8 Perhaps most importantly, federalism provides citizens the opportunity to
impact government on a local level, helping to make it more responsive to the
immediate needs and evolving values of individual communities, and less susceptible
to bureaucratic inertia and elitism that exists on the federal level.8
78. See U.S. CONST. art. V (constitutional amendment); id. art. VII (ratification of amendments); id. art. I,
§ 2 (states' regulation of elections); id. art. L § 4 (dual regulation); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112. 125-
26 (1970) ("Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen and Twenty-Four, each... has assumed that the States had
general supervisory power over state elections ... :); Starr et al., supra note 36, at 43.
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. L §§ 8. 9 (limiting congressional authority by enumerating its powers); see
also Starr et al., supra note 36, at 43.
82. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. L § 10 (limiting the states' power to engage in aspects of national regulation);
see also Starr et al., supra note 36, at 43.
83. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts
... of every other State... "); id. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government... :'); see also Starr et al., supra note 36, at 43-44.
84. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 96.
85. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 96 (explaining the importance of using the states as laboratories for
regulatory innovation because such diversity allows for experimentation on a local level without risking harm to
the nation as a whole).
86. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 42-43 (directing that the continued vitality of state and local
govemments exercises a check over the national government by exerting organized public pressure over centripetal
political forces).
87. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 42-43 (quoting Justice Brandeis, who stated that one of the advantages
of the federal system is the ability of the states to experiment on a local level) (quoting New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
88. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 42 (explaining that the ability of state and local governments to respond
directly and amenably to citizens within its specific jurisdiction is an important advantage of the federal system).
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In order to maintain the great advantages embodied in the federalist system, the
national government must not intrude so far into local interests and the states' sphere
of control as to usurp their powers. 89 But, equilibrium between these two factions can
only be maintained if Congress engages in clear and explicit legislative deliberation,
allowing the mechanisms inherent in our representational system to strike a balance
between national uniformity and state autonomy?°
The Court renounced any significant role in policing federalism with its decision
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.91 In Garcia, the Court
considered the extent to which the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority could
be subjected to the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.92 The Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,93
thus abandoning the four part test articulated in that case for determining when
federal legislation under the commerce power exceeds the independent limitations
imposed by the Tenth Amendment.94 Instead, the Court concluded that state
sovereign interests are protected from Congress's power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause by "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
government," not by "judicially created limitations on federal powers."95 Garcia
reaffirmed the belief that the Framers specifically designed our federal government
in part to protect the states from overreaching by Congress.96 The Court recognized
that the true, fundamental limitations inherent in all congressional action are the
built-in restraints provided by our system through state participation in federal
government action, not by judicial intervention.97 The political process is the device
ensuring that laws excessively impairing the autonomy of the states, or the rights of
the citizens of those states, will not be promulgated, and if enacted, will be
repealed.98
Thus, limits still do exist on all congressional action. As Garcia emphasized, it
is the vital importance of the states' representation in Congress, the procedural safe-
guards, that function through each state's constituency to restrain the ability of the
89. Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1657, 1670-71 (1987).
90. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (explaining that the constituency must be able to locate
a politically accountable decision-maker in order to prevent the federal government from overreaching into state
authority).
91. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
92. Id. at 533.
93. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
94. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.546-47.
95. Id. at 552.
96. Id. at 550-51.
97. Id. at 556.
98. Id.
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federal government to reach beyond its enumerated powers. 9 According to the
Supreme Court, the political process warrants that unduly burdensome laws will be
corrected by electing representatives responsive to the needs of their own
constituents. 'a Through this system, the states retain a voice in our federalist system,
by holding accountable duly elected decision-makers.
The theory set forth in Garcia simply reiterated a basic tenet established by the
Founders. In correspondence leading up to the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
George Washington clearly expressed the necessary role of the American people, and
the states, in maintaining an equal balance in our federal system.'O' In a letter to
Bushrod Washington, his nephew and future Supreme Court Justice, George
Washington wrote:
The power under the Constitution will always be in the People. It is
entrusted for certain defined purposes, and for a certain limited period, to
representatives of their own chusing; and whenever it is executed contrary
to their Interest, or not agreeable to their wishes, then Servants can, and
undoubtably will-be, recalled.'02
These ideas, reestablished in Garcia, are just as important to the proper functioning
of today's government as they were to the Framers in fashioning the Constitution.
Because of the constitutional nature of preemption, the firmly rooted principle
of balancing state and federal interests through the political processes is particularly
applicable in that area.'03 Therefore when Congress acts directly in the field of
preemption, it must do so in clear and direct language as to its intentions to preempt
that particular field.13 4 Using a distinctly recognizable legislative purpose insures that
the implicit protections built into the federal system can adequately respond to those
responsible for unpopular lawmaking. 0 5 But in an era of expanded governmental
authority, where congressional delegations place lawmaking and preemptive power
in other, less responsible hands, the clear and direct voice of Congress becomes
99. See id. at 551-52 (noting that the composition of the federal government was designed to protect the
states from overreaching by Congress through the states' role in the selection of both the Executive and the
Legislative branches).
100. Id.
101. THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrruTION 81-84 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) (correspondence
of George Washington to Bushrod Washington. Nov. 10, 1787).
102. Id. at 83.
103. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 96-102 (describing the interrelationship between the preemption doctrine
and federalism); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)
(pointing out that state sovereignty is protected by the procedural safeguards implicit in the federal system).
104. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 50 (expressing Professor Tribe's view that a clear statement of
Congress's intent to displace state law is necessary to ensure that the political safeguards work).
105. Id.
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muffled, and the states are no longer afforded the distinct protections against
preemption that are implicit in the federalist structure. t"
The importance of federalism restraints within the context of administrative
preemption are further highlighted by the questionable support for broad con-
gressional transfers of power that frequently vest preemptive authority in adminis-
trative agencies. Both commentators and legislators have voiced concern in this area
and advocate a resurgence of scrutiny over delegations by the legislative branch to
administrative agencies. 07
IV. LMITs ON BROAD CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS OF POWER TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. The Framers Intended Article Ito Limit Congressional Delegations
Congressional ability to delegate powers to agencies is limited both by the
Constitution and by inherent democratic principles. 0 8 Allowing administrative
agencies to become lawmakers through rule-making and independent interpretations
of congressional statutes weakens the governmental structure of "checks and
balances."'t 9 Administrative agency staffers are unelected and are not politically
accountable; therefore, they should not be given unrestrained freedom to formulate
policy and law. ° In addition, the process of approving grants of broad rule-making
106. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (explaining the need for a similar set of safeguards on the
administrative process as are available when Congress legislates).
107. See, e.g., DAvIDSCHOENROD, POWERWrrI~oTREsPONSIBILrrY:HowCONGRESsABusESTHE PEOKE
THROUGH DELEGATION passim (1993) (exploring the real-world causes and consequences of congressional
delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies); Nick Smith (R.-Mich.), Restoration of Congressional
Authority and Responsibility Over the Regulatory Process, 33 HARv. 3. ON LEGIs. 323 (1996) (illustrating that
administrative agency staffers, to whom enormous lawmaking power is delegated by Congress, are not politically
accountable to the American People who are affected by these regulations).
108. See Aranson et aL., A Theory on Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1982) (stating that
separation of powers principles and John Locke's Contractarian view of government limited Congress's authority
to delegate away its legislative powers); Gary Lawson, Changing Images of the State: The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HAR. L Ray. 1231, 1233 (1994) (explaining that congressional delegations contravene
the constitutional principles of limited powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (expounding that "[aill legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in [ Congress").
109. See Odom, supra note 89, at 1675-76 (proposing that, in order to increase national government
accountability for intrusion into areas of state interest, and to impose checks on the congressional practice of
delegating authority to administrative agencies, decisions on whether to usurp state autonomy should be made by
a "political" branch of government).
110. See, e.g., Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint to Congress's Exceptions Clause Power, 106 YAE LEJ. 197, 200
(1996) (stating that Congress's increased delegations to administrative agencies and its own diminished
accountability has led many courts and commentators to conclude that unaccountable legislation is unconstitutional
legislation); Smith, supra note 107, at 327 (pointing out that delegation subverts our representational system of
government because, although the people confer legitimate lawmaking power on Congress through elections, they
do not extend this power to unelected bureaucrats); Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (explaining that because agency
officials lack the political sensibilities of members of Congress, they do not have the "appropriate instinct to
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authority enables Congress to detach itself from unpopular decisions and avoid its
own constitutionally mandated accountability."'
Congress stretches the boundaries of its constitutional duty to make the law when
it delegates to agencies. The constitutional foundation of this country embodies the
original contract between the American people and the government, which speci-
fically granted lawmaking power to Congress." 2 The Constitution provides for a
system of separation of powers, spelling out the role of the legislative, executive, and
judiciary.'13 In particular, Article I ordains that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress."'" 4 This specific provision has always been
read by the Supreme Court as implicitly providing some limits to the delegation of
Congress's lawmaking authority." 5 This limitation principle makes Congress adhere
to its role as the governmental body that attempts to provide the most effective and
efficient representation of the American people' 1 6 Failure to follow this constitu-
tionally grounded principle encourages arbitrary policy decisions, and results in
congressional delegations of lawmaking power to agencies through broad and often
ambiguous statutes."17 Once an agency without significant political accountability for
its decisions has been given broad authority through a congressional delegation, that
agency can implement its own policy choices free from significant incentives "to
abide by the People's mandate which is to provide reasonable decisions that are in
the nation's best interests."" 8
When the Framers developed our republican form of government, they were
influenced by the wisdom of political theorists. Perhaps the most influential force
behind the formation of our republican form of government was John Locke, who
articulated one of the important boundaries of legislative authority to be that:
accommodate state interests").
111. Testimony of Jerry Taylor to the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law Committee on the
Judiciary 16 (Sept. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Testimony of Jerry Taylor]; see also Peter Marra, Comment, Have
Administrative Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SErON HALL CONST. LJ. 763, 785 (1996) (arguing that
delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies enables Congress to take credit for addressing popular
issues while detaching itself from unpopular issues).
112. See Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 4-5 (explaining the Contractarian view that law derives its
legitimacy from the consent of the governed); see also Marra, supra note 11I, at 787-88 (describing the contract
between the American people and the government, in which the people gave up absolute control over their own
affairs in exchange for a limited government composed of elected representatives).
113. Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 779.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
115. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928) (stating that the applicable test
constraining the national legislature's authority to delegate congressional power to others was whether Congress
has laid "down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates
is directed to conform").
116. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99-106 (discussing that Congress, and to a lesser extent the
President, provide accountability to the American people); see also Marra, supra note 111, at 786-88 (arguing that
members of Congress, as elected representatives of the People, are more responsive than governmental bodies
insulated from accountability to our Nation's constituency).
117. See SCHOENBROD, supra noie 107, at 786-87.
118. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 789.
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The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other
hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they who have
it, cannot pass it over to others ... ."9
Following these ideals, the Framers developed a government by which the American
people exchanged absolute control over their own affairs, in return for a government
composed of elected representatives.12 Through this system, the people maintained
power to control the law and lawmakers who governed them by duly electing the
officials.22 Broad delegations to administrative agencies frustrate this carefully
designed system because the lawmaking power is no longer vested in elected
officials.122 Therefore, this type of delegation is weakly rooted in our democratic
scheme that promised congressional constituents influence over the laws and
lawmakers.'2
The American people, through the Framers, have by means of Article I placed
the power to legislate solely in the hands of Congress. Congress must act carefully
so as not to upset the governmental balance between the branches by removing the
necessary checks on this authority. Keeping this objective in mind, excessive
delegation of power to agencies by Congress is only weakly grounded in the
constitutional scheme, if justified at all. Such excessive delegation not only violates
the ideas of separation of powers,'24 but also breaches the contract with the American
people by allowing unaccountable administrative agency staffers to create policy.125
When Congress gives away lawmaking power, it defaults on the bargained for
exchange upon which the Framers justified Congress's claim of authority over the
laws that govern the citizenry; that right was expressly conditioned upon an elected
body of decision-makers.126 Thus, depending on the nature of the delegation,
119. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREAnSE ON GOVERNMENT 79 (Prometheus Books, 1986); see also
SCHOENEROD, supra note 107, at 155-56 (expressing John Locke's view that all legislative power should be vested
in Congress alone and that this was probably the intent of the Framers as well).
120. See Marra, supra note 111, at 787 (stating that the Framers developed our republican form of
government with the idea that the American People would relinquish complete control over their own lives to the
government, in exchange for the power to elect lawmakers and thus retain some influence over the lawmaking
process); see also Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L REV. 345, 347-48 (1985) (discussing
the theoretical basis for the view that legislators are accountable for their decisions).
121. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99 (illustrating that, by refusing to reelect a legislator who has
voted for unfavorable laws, the constituents exercise control over the lawmaking process).
122. See Smith, supra note 107, at 323, 325-26 (explaining that agency officials, consisting of unelected civil
servants and political appointees, are seldom personally affected by their own rule-making or accountable to those
affected).
123. See Handman, supra note 110, at 214 (stating that when policy does not emanate from a politically
accountable body such as Congress, the legislative product is not only corrupt, but also unconstitutional because
the lawmaking is not predicated on popular support).
124. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional limits on lawmaking
power).
125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing the original contract between the American
people and the government).
126. See Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 4-5.
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Congress can stretch the limits of its constitutionally mandated duty to make the law.
However, the real danger of unconstitutional congressional action emerges when
Congress delegates the power to preempt state laws to administrative agencies.27 In
that context, not only is Article I extended to the limit of the Constitution, but the
procedural safeguards of federalism that inherently maintain the federal-state balance
of power become unworkable absent the People's ability to locate politically
accountable decision-makers responsible for preemptive legislation.'2
B. The Treatment of the Nondelegation Doctrine in the Courts
1. Early Judicial Interpretation of the Doctrine
Early decisions by the Supreme Court reflect an interpretation of Article I and
the nondelegation doctrine to bar giving others the power to make the law.'29 In Field
v. Clark,t30 the Court upheld the Tariff Act of 1890, which placed a tariff on
imported goods if the country sending the goods imposed a tariff on American goods
that was viewed as "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable."' Although under the
Tariff Act the decision was left to the President to determine whether the other
nation's goods were reciprocally unequal, this finding was allowed only because the
President's authority was classified as purely nonlegislative 3 2 The Court permitted
the delegation on the grounds that the President's authority was solely a fact-finding
power and not a lawmaking power.'
33
The opinion of the Court, written by the first Justice Harlan, illustrated the idea
that only non-legislative grants of authority were permissible under the Constitution:
That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution.13
Although recognizing the importance of keeping structural integrity, Field at the
same time recognized that practical government involves some delegation as a
necessity to preserving the functioning role of a constantly growing, and increasingly
127. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (explaining that delegation of preemptive authority to
administrative agencies is a dangerous proposition because this type of delegation undermines federalism restraints
on federal government power).
128. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of the political process to
function effectively within the context of administrative preemption).
129. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 3.
130. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
131. Id. at692.
132. Id. at 693.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 692.
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complex, system of legislation.135 However, acquiescence to administrative agency
decisions should not be founded merely on the basis of technical competence and
efficiency. 36 In order to preserve the structural integrity of the Constitution, which
establishes a government based on separation of powers and popular representation,
delegation must be confined within our constitutional structure, by placing the power
to make laws in the hands of the elected members of Congress 37
The Supreme Court first explicitly applied limits on congressional delegations
in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States. 38 In J.W. Hampton, Jr., the Court
upheld as constitutional the flexible provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922, which gave
the President discretion not only when to apply the tariff on imports, but to set the
tariff rate as well. 39 However, the Court expressed its view that such delegations
were intended to be limited, specifically stating that delegation is only permissible
"[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform."'1
4
Under the "intelligible principle" standard, the Court sought to ensure that
Congress would give adequate guidance to the behavior of the delegate.' 41 Thus, the
legislature would be sure to retain control over policy decisions, the power of
"making the law."' 42 The Court impressed this model on delegation to counter the
fear that, absent congressional direction, agency staffers would use their own dis-
cretion when deciding issues that directly affect the livelihood of the American
people. 43 In essence, the administrative rule-maker would function as a legislator,
constituting an unconstitutional exercise of Article I power by a body restricted to the
interpretation and execution of the law. 44
135. Lisa Cahill & J. Russell Jackson, Note, Nondelegation After Mistretta: Phoenix or Phaethon?, 31 WM.
& MARYL. REv. 1047, 1054 (1990) ("Justice Harlan acknowledged that '[tihere are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a
subject of inquiry and determination outside the halls of legislation.'") (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694
(1892)).
136. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (observing that although administrative agencies promote uniformity
and efficiency, these are only a few aspects of the delegation process).
137. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (stating that the states rely on political and procedural safeguards
to retain an equal balance between federal and state interest in the administrative process).
138. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
139. J.W Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 401.
140. Id. at 409.
141. Cahill & Jackson, supra note 135, at 1056.
142. Cahill & Jackson, supra note 135, at 1056.
143. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,276 (1967). The Court in Robel noted that "[flormulation of policy
is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates
authority under indefinite standards, this policy-making function is passed on to agencies, often not answerable or
responsive in the same degree to the people." Id.; see Cahill & Jackson, supra note 135, at 1056 (explaining that
under the "intelligible principle" standard set forth in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., the judiciary ensured that the
legislature would retain the power to make the law, and delegates would not be able to implement their own policy
choices).
144. Cahill & Jackson, supra note 135, at 1056.
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Soon after the decision in J.W. Hampton, Jr., in which the "intelligible principle"
standard was articulated, the Court faced the question of how broadly its rationale
could be construed. Without warning, the Court brought the nondelegation doctrine
to life, turning it against congressional efforts to implement the New Deal.145 In
particular, the doctrine was initially aimed at the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) enacted by Congress in 1933,'46 which, under the authority of hasty legis-
lation, gave the President almost total control of the nation's economy.' 47
In Panama Refining Company v. Ryan,'48 the Court considered section 9(c) of
the NIRA, which authorized the President to prohibit the interstate transportation of
petroleum products that were either produced or withdrawn from storage contrary to
state law.149 Writing the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes found section
9(c) to be an unlawful delegation of congressional power because it failed to articu-
late legislative criteria to guide the President when deciding whether to invoke the
statutorily authorized prohibitions'5
Soon after the decision in Panama Refining, the Court again used the non-
delegation doctrine to invalidate more New Deal legislation. In A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, ' the Court reviewed the NIRA's provisions allowing
trade unions to create their own codes of fair competition.5 2 Once again, Chief
Justice Hughes, writing the opinion of the Court, invalidated the delegation. 53 But
perhaps Justice Cardozo, who had dissented in Panama Refining but now concurred
in the judgment in Schechter, best articulated the importance of this decision:
The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code
is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It-is unconfined
and vagrant .... Here... is an attempted delegation not confined to any
single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by
reference to a standard. Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into
evils and upon discovery correct them. 4
145. Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 8.
146. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 701, 702
(1935).
147. Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 8.
148. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
149. Id. at 406.
150. Id. at 433.
151. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
152. Id. at 521-27.
153. Id. at 551.
154. A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J.. concurring).
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Justice Cardozo addressed the fear that administrative agencies, which are supposed
to enforce the laws made by Congress, would instead become the lawmakers if they
were given unrestrained power through overly broad delegations.
155
Soon after the decisions in Schechter and Panama Refining, however, the
Supreme Court changed direction, upholding delegation of powers to administrative
agencies.156 Thereafter, the nondelegation doctrine all but disappeared as a constraint
on the delegation of authority to administrative agencies for the next thirty to forty
years. 57 Routinely, courts began to validate expansive delegations without hesita-
tion.1 58 Congress encountered no limits on its ability to delegate lawmaking power
as long as the legislation was guided by goals the delegate should seek to attain. 59
The Court upheld broad delegations in traditionally regulated fields, postulating the
rationale that delegated agencies were adequately guided by experience and prior
rulings.t6° Injustifying these broad post-Schechter and Panama Refining delegations,
the Court has stated that delegation, in those circumstances, was consistent with the
constitutional goals of both democracy and liberty.16 ' But as delegation has become
even more prominent in our system of a large centralized government, this unques-
tioned tool for efficiency and uniformity has again begun to find skeptics.
62
155. Id. at 551-55 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
156. Cahill & Jackson, supra note 135, at 1057-58.
157. Cihill & Jackson, supra note 135, at 1057-58; see SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 41 (stating that the
postwar Congresses were not limited by the judiciary in their ability to delegate lawmaking to federal officials as
long as the statutes reflected "something about the goals that the agency laws should seek to attain").
158. See, e.g.. Lichterv. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (providing for the recovery of"excessive
profits" earned from war contracts); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,420-21 (1944) (authorizing the President
to appoint a price administrator to set the maximum prices during times of war "in the interest of the national
defense and security"); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,600 (1944) (authorizing
the Federal Power Commission to set "just and reasonable" rates on natural gas); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190,225-27 (1943) (licensing of radio communications systems "as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires'); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 545 n.4 (1939) (sustaining
delegations under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act which permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to set
prices for agricultural products); New York Cent. Secs. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932) (permitting
the consolidation of carriers when "in the public interest"). For an extensive supplementary list of judicial
ratifications of broad delegations, see Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 n.9 (D.D.C. 1996). aff'd sub
noma. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
159. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 41.
160. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 41; see, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
172-73 (1968) (holding that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had authority to regulate cable
television even though that technology did not exist at the time the FCC's enabling legislation was enacted); Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,250 (1947) (holding that the statute authorizing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to regulate reorganization, consolidation, merger, or liquidation of building and loan associations with power to
appoint conservator or receiver, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative functions, since it involves mere
regulation in a well-established field).
161. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,429-31 (1944) (sustaining a wartime measure that gave the
Office of Price Administration extensive powers to fix commodity prices); see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737,758 (D.D.C. 1971) (three judge panel) (upholding the 1970 Economic Stabilization
Act's broad grant of discretion to the President to limit wage and prices increases).
162. See, e.g., SCHO BROD, supra note 1 07 passim (discussing the problems with congressional delegations
to administrative agencies).
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2. Continued Vitality of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Judicial Decisions
Distrust of delegation has once again emerged in the last thirty years because of
the growing sentiment that independent agencies and the executive branch were no
longer merely implementing the law but making it.163 Professor Richard Stewart
stated in reference to a "period of renewed respectability" for the nondelegation
doctrine in the 1960's that:
It is no accident that the revival of interest in the delegation doctrine in
recent years has coincided with a sweeping expansion of centralized federal
command and control regulation. We have become addicted to federal rules
and orders that attempt to minutely prescribe conduct throughout our
complexly differentiated society. This addiction has created severe
decisionmaking and political overload at the center. In turn, overload has
resulted in a massive transfer of decisional power to federal administrative
bureaucracies, provoking calls for vigorous enforcement by the courts of the
delegation doctrine in order to restore "juridical democracy.""
These ideas are implicated in post Schechter and Panama Refining decisions.
Although the Court has not specifically relied upon the nondelegation doctrine as the
foundation for a decision, it has also refused to repudiate it. 65 In a number of
opinions of the Court, and in the separate opinions of individual justices, the non-
delegation principle has received favorable mention.' 66 In Kent v. Dulles, ' 67for
instance, the Court referred to the doctrine in an effort to support a narrow statutory
construction of a seemingly broad congressional statute. 68 Specifically, the Court
interpreted a regulation permitting the Secretary of State to refuse to issue a passport
because of an applicant's membership in the Communist party as not authorized by
statute.' 69 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas explained his narrow inter-
pretation of the statute by reasoning that if he had read it any broader the text of the
statute might be considered to be an overly broad, and thus invalid, delegation. 70
163. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at42.
164. Richard Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323,329 (1987).
165. Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 12.
166. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 548 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that the rule-making power conferred upon the OSHA to promulgate workplace
safety and health standards for limiting workers' exposure to cotton dust was unconstitutionally broad); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that
section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act constituted an invalid delegation to the Secretary of
Labor).
167. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
168. Id. at 129.
169. Id. at 129-30.
170. Id. at 129; see Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 12.
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Individual justices have also signaled the continuing validity of the doctrine in
concurring and dissenting opinions that refer to nondelegation." Then Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute172 illustrates this point. That case involved a challenge to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act's (OSHA) new health standard, which limited occupational
exposure to airborne concentrations of benzene.' 73 Justice Rehnquist, in his con-
currence, argued that section 6(b)(5) of the OSHA constituted a broad, invalid
delegation to the Secretary of Labor.1 74 He attributed the confusion in interpreting the
statute's legislative history, and the widely disparate views of the other justices and
the litigants, as an indication that Congress had not done its job, but had instead
impermissibly delegated its legislative authority to the executive branch.!75 Justice
Rehnquist summed up his point when he complained that the "governmental body
best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this litigation, ...
has improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to
this Court."' 76
Similarly, in his dissent in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.
Donovan,177 Justice Rehnquist articulated the same nondelegation argument. In that
case, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 required OSHA to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis in promulgating workplace safety standards for limiting
workers' exposure to cotton dust. 178 Justice Rehnquist, joined in the dissent by then
Chief Justice Burger, reiterated his conviction that the nondelegation doctrine
mandated that the Court find the statute unconstitutionally broad.79
These are just a few illustrations of the recognition of the nondelegation doctrine
in recent judicial decisions..Each of these individual opinions, along with Panama
Refining and Schechter, represent the continuing view that, when Congress delegates
overly broad authority to administrative agencies, it has exercised powers that have
a weak foundation in the constitutional design.
171. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 548 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C,,
dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
172. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 607.
174. Id. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
175. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
177. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
178. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 493-95.
179. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 548 (Rehnquist, J., and Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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C. Broad Delegations of Power by Congress Subvert the Constitutional
Principles of Separation of Powers and Proper Congressional Authority
As discussed in Part IV.A above, the doctrine of nondelegation derives its
support from both the text and history of the Constitution.!8 Both the Framers, and
the political theorists who influenced the ideals the Founders embodied in the
Constitution, expounded principles of separation of powers and a binding contract
between the American people that does not allow Congress to delegate broad powers
to unaccountable bureaucrats. 18' In order for representative government to function
properly, the constituency must retain its influence over the laws that govern it.
182
This principle that overly broad delegations are not firmly rooted in the
Constitution was represented in Court decisions invalidating New Deal legislation. 8
In addition, the idea of nondelegation has retained potential validity through the
opinions of individual justices in recent cases. '" Although the doctrine's foundation
in both our history and jurisprudence is not absolutely rooted to the text of the
Constitution or Supreme Court precedent, it appears undeniable that when Congress
combines statutory ambiguity with delegations to administrative agencies, the
constitutionality of Congress's power is not at its strongest point.85 Further, when
Congress is not expressly empowered to act by the Constitution, as in the case of
delegating legislative powers, its actions should be closely scrutinized in order to
preserve the principles inherent in the Constitution and protect individual liberties.'6
In the area of preemption, Congress's decisions should be closely monitored to
prevent the subversion of federalism restraints and infringement into the states'
sphere of control. And when both the concept of delegation and preemption are
implemented simultaneously through administrative preemption, both federalism and
Article I concerns are in danger of being overlooked. This type of challenge to our
constitutional structure necessitates that the utmost precaution must be exercised in
congressional delegations of power to agencies and their staffers, because unelected
bureaucrats often interpret this authority to give them the ability to displace state
laws.
180. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
181. Aranson et al., supra note 108, at 2-5.
182. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99.
183. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 166-79 and accompanying text.
185. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99-164 (discussing constitutional prohibitions and the weakening
of democracy that is effectuated by delegation).
186. See SCOHOaIROD, supra note 107, at 155-64 (emphasizing the unconstitutionality of delegating Article
I powers).
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V. FEDERALISM RESTRAINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PREEMPTION
Preemption is a carefully balanced constitutional device epitomizing the need for
political checks to avoid congressional overreaching. Congress has not been endowed
with unlimited power to preempt state law.187 In fact, because Congress rarely
intrudes upon the sensitive balance between federal and state authority as much in
favor of the federal government as it does when it preempts state law, this con-
stitutional domain, in particular, must have restraints. 8  As federal power grows,
state autonomy shrinks. In order to give meaning to the intent of the Framers of our
federal government and thus, the People themselves, there must be some constraints
on the power to preempt or delegate preemptive power' 89 Judicial limits on pre-
emption were voiced by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.190
This decision announced a presumption against congressional preemption. 191
Specifically, Rice presumes that Congress does not intend to preempt areas of
traditional state concern, such as public health and safety, without clear congressional
intent to do so. 92 Therefore, because of this presumption, Congress is required to
think hard and speak clearly before displacing state law. 93 By articulating this pre-
liminary statutory construction, the Court protects the states' autonomy by enforcing
limits on how Congress can preempt, and reflects the judicial attempts to restore
balance in our federalist system. 94
In addition to judicial limits on the extent of Congress's power to preempt state
law, some commentators, building on Garcia's principles, have expounded the
concept that the practical boundaries confining the usurpation of state authority exist
within the enforcement of the political process.' 95 This theory dictates that relying on
the states' voices in our federal system, and representative democracy, will constrain
Congress from overreaching the bounds the Framers intended by the Commerce
Clause and the Supremacy Clause. 96 At the core of this type of protection is the
touchstone that constituents are capable of locating the root of political accountability
187. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (dictating the presumption that a federal
statute will not preempt well-established areas of state law unless Congress explicitly conveys an intent to do so).
188. Mcgreal, supra note 58, at 823-24.
189. Mcgreal, supra note 58, at 823.
190. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see Mcgreal, supra note 58, at 824.
193. See Mcgreal, supra note 58, at 826 (stating that the Rice presumption against preemption requires a court
to reject preemption without the presence of clear congressional intent to displace state law).
194. Id. at 824.
195. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (explaining that, when both Congress legislates and
administrative agencies regulate, the states rely on procedural safeguards to protect their interests).
196. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 48 (stating that states' regulatory powers are protected from excessive
intrusion by the federal government because members of Congress are drawn from the states and responsive to the
concerns of their constituents).
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within the federal-state balance of power. 97 Then, by disfavoring state repre-
sentatives responsible for the disproportionate or overly intrusive legislation, states
exercise control over their own laws and liberties.9"
Congress often entrusts a federal agency with the administration of a wide
variety of federal statutes, and administrative preemption in that context "is pre-
dicated solely upon the agency's express statement that it intends (by federal
regulation) to displace state law."199 An illustrative example of this process appeared
in City of New York v. Federal Communications Commission,2°° in which the Court
held that the FCC's technical standards for cable systems superseded the stricter local
standards as to the quality of cable television signals.2 The Court limited its judicial
inquiry, stating that federal regulations, if consistent with the federal statute, will act
to preempt state law.0 2 The opinion further explained that the federal agency has
broad discretion in this context and that "a narrow focus on Congress's intent to
supersede state law [is] misdirected," for "[a] preemptive regulation's force does not
depend on express Congressional authorization to displace state law."203 In other
words, once Congress delegates authority to a federal agency to regulate through a
broad statute, difficult policy determinations including preemption of state law are
within that agency's discretion.2 4
This broad power of administrative preemption allows federal agencies to make
political decisions affecting the federal-state balance of power implicit in preemption.
Therefore, at a minimum, the same limits that apply to congressional preemption
should apply to preemption by federal agencies because both affect individual
liberties in the same way.205
However, when Congress delegates authority to an administrative agency and its
government officials thereafter preempt state law, political accountability fails to
197. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 112 (explaining that, in order to simultaneously protect both the political
safeguards of federalism and give congressional action deference. Congress must be clear whenever it preempts
state laws outside those areas the Constitution reserved to Congress alone).
198. See Odom, supra note 89, at 1675 (proposing that the national political process identified in Garcia
would prevent federal overreaching by administrative agencies if decisions that expanded national government's
authority into areas of state interests were made by a branch of government subject to the political constraints of
federalism, instead of by agency officials who are not politically accountable).
199. See Starr et al., supra note 36, at 31 (stating that administrative preemption is founded upon an agency's
explicit statement that it intends to displace state law); see also Foote, supra note 40, at 1445 (describing FDA
regulations promulgated to preempt state tort claims under the Medical Device Amendments, even though the
regulations failed to accurately implement Congress's preemptive intent).
200. 108 S. Ct. 1637 (1988).
201. Id. at 1642-43.
202. Id. at 1642.
203. Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982)).
204. Starr et al., supra note 36, at 32.
205. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110; see Chapin, supra note 43, at 60-61 (articulating that just as lawmaking
authority is limited by the Constitution, regulatory preemption authority of federal agencies should be limited by
express grants of preemptive authority within the relevant federal legislation; only through this type of clear state-
ment of congressional accountability can the political process be employed by the state governments to protect their
interests in regulatory preemption matters).
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provide the states with a means to fairly balance the competing interests.2
Administrative preemption decisions are made without facing the constraints of the
democratic process because independent agencies are virtually insulated from
political forces.2 7 The protections of the political process available to state con-
stituents when preemption decisions are made by a responsible legislature are not
available when Congress delegates to agencies, and they, in turn, preempt state
laws.208 Without the applicability of this procedural safeguard for the states,
Congress's power to delegate preemptive authority to administrative agencies runs
counter to the theory of federalism that the Framers intended. In the delegation
situation, decisions made by unelected agency officials provide no recourse for the
governed through politically accountable decision-making.
VI. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING
A. Rationale for Political Accountability
One of the fundamental safeguards of our federalist system is a watchful,
responsible constituency.209 When important policy choices are made by Congress,
or another governmental body, without the external constraint of public scrutiny, the
legislation bears less assurance of legitimacy.21 ° If the lawmaking or rule-making
process lacks political accountability, "the public generally is denied the benefits that
are derived from the making of important societal choices through the open debate
of the democratic process."21' Political accountability firmly establishes one of the
important tenets of representative government: that Congress must make the impor-
tant choices and endure the consequences of those choices.212 Therefore, Congress
may not delegate the power to decide salient policy issues to another organ of
government, particularly in the area of preemption, where delegation may disable the
functioning of federalism restraints on the federal-state balance of power 1
As strongly as the American political system demands political accountability
in congressional decision-making, legislators have similarly strong reasons for
206. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (stating that no administrative safeguards can function as well as
the threat of impending congressional elections).
207. See Smith, supra note 107, at 323 (pointing out that agency staffers are seldom truly accountable to those
affected by the regulations they write).
208. See ScHoENBROD, supra note 107, at 103 (directing attention to the fact that when Congress delegates,
it does not have to cast a recorded vote on the particular issue and open up its individual members to criticism for
their decision).
209. Handman, supra note 110. at 212.
210. Handman, supra note 110, at 212.
211. Handman, supra note 110, at 212 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979)
(Powell, J.. dissenting)).
212. SCIHoENBROD, supra note 107, at 103.
213. Handman, supra note 110, at 212.
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avoiding responsibility.2 14 The ability of members of Congress to insulate divisive
policy choices from public scrutiny will not only avoid a dissatisfied constituency,
but it will more likely sustain a majority of votes by not antagonizing different
ideological factions with difficult policy decisions.2t5
Political accountability, a by-product of constitutional legislation, functions to
check the legislative process against an overreaching centralized government, and
implements rights-protective government policy because it ensures that policies
emanating from Congress are founded on popular support.2 6 But when Congress or
another body is able to escape the political ramifications of the policy it establishes,
the legitimacy of the law is suspect.
2 17
Our system of federalism developed by this country's Founders never considered
that the lawmaking process would raise the elements implicit in large government
delegations, such as an agency's efficiency and expertise, above individual liberties
and careful policy choices. 218 The Framers specifically created political checks and
balances; they understood that this process would be laborious and somewhat
inefficient, but in return understood that it would reap the benefits of societal input
and minimize the possibility of tyranny.2?19 As the Supreme Court, affirming the
Framers' goals for the legislative process, has stated:
[I]t is crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous
writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values higher than
efficiency. The records of the Convention and debates in the states preceding
ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the exercise of
the newly created federal powers affecting the states and the people. There
is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the
National Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process 20
In responding to statements of the Framers and the Supreme Court, many com-
mentators in the area of delegation contend that, although deference to the wisdom
214. Handman, supra note 110, at 212; see discussion infra Part VI.C.1 (discussing the reasons Congress
attempts to blur the responsibility for promulgating divisive legislation).
215. Handman, supra note 110, at 212.
216. Handman, supra note 110, at 212-14.
217. Handman, supra note 110, at 213.
218. Handman, supra note 110, at 213.
219. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 40, at 359 (James Madison) ("In the extended republic of
the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a
majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and general good
.... "); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 40, at 129 (James Madison) ("Among the numerous advantages
promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break
and control the violence of faction."); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 40, at 348 (James Madison) ("The
several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is
evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers...
without an appeal to the people themselves... ").
220. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,958-59 (1983).
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of agency experts may be more efficient, "ultimate wisdom compels deference to the
original constitutional design.''2t
Allowing Congress to avoid responsibility through the delegation of its essential
lawmaking power, particularly in the area of preempting state governmental
functions, thwarts the federalism aspect implicit in our constitutional design
2 2
Although defenders of broad agency powers argue that administrative bodies are
accountable to the legislature through congressional oversight,2 3 this argument runs
counter to the legislators' goal of blurring their own accountability and preventing
divisive legislation.24 Thus, the important restraints on federal power fail to protect
the states from an overreaching government where Congress delegates the power to
preempt to federal agencies.2 -
Unfortunately, in the area of preemption, the view that political accountability
exists as the last defense to state sovereignty is more theory than actuality. By dele-
gating the power of regulatory preemption, Congress has subverted the constitutional
scheme. -
B. The Theory of Administrative Agency Accountability Through Congress
Accountability for those who make decisions is both critical to the maintenance
of democracy2 7 and the legitimacy of rule-making.2  Only when people can be
secure in the knowledge that administrative rule-making is being conducted under
the watchful eye of elected officials is rule-making validated? 9 Perhaps the most
important link in the accountability chain, especially in relation to administrative pre-
emption, exists between Congress and the agencies. Because the hallmark of pre-
emption is the search for clear congressional intent to displace state law, any attempt
to expand federal power at the expense of the states must be responsible through the
221. Handman, supra note 110, at 213.
222. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 100-01.
223. See discussion infra Part VI.B. (discussing whether congressional oversight is a sufficient source of
accountability for administrative rule-making).
224. See Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 11I, at 16-17 (stating that one of the main reasons Congress
delegates its lawmaking power is to manipulate voter perceptions about who is making the unpopular laws),
225. See Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 16 (."[E]verybody' is accountable and nobody is
accountable under the way Congress is setting it up, but the legislators have got a designated whipping boy."); see
also Wolfson, supra note 41, at 114 (maintaining that excessive deference to administrative agencies' decisions
to preempt the states fails to protect the political and judicial safeguards of federalism).
226. Wolfson, supra note 41, at 114.
227. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 100-01 (illustrating that delegation of rule-making authority by
Congress weakens democracy because agency accountability through Congress is a weak proposition).
228. See Handman, supra note 110, at 216 (supporting the proposition that "political accountability sets a
minimum standard for legislative responsibility" and quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist saying that "when
fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted are to be made, the buck stop5
with Congress...."); see also CORNELIUS M. KEPWiN, RULEMAKING 215 (1994) (maintaining that rule-making
is legitimized when those responsible for the rules are politically accountable).
229. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 215.
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Legislature.2' 0 Only in this type of system can poor decisions, extending too far into
the traditional domain of the states via preemption, be counteracted through new
legislation or new representatives.3 Congressional accountability in a federalist
system serves as the backbone for rights-protective legislation, especially in the
preemption context where state laws and state autonomy is displaced by federal
statutes. 2
Logically, policy decisions and lawmaking power usurped by administrative
agencies must also adopt this dimension of the constitutional scheme 33 The only
way to make administrative bodies accountable to voters is by clearly indicating the
role of legislators in the administrative rule-making process, thus making elected
officials responsible for the actions taken by agency staffers.23 Therefore, Congress
must fulfill the role of overseeing the rule-making process.35 Although in theory
Congress exerts controls and checks over agency staffers, in reality, members of
Congress have alternative agendas such as avoiding the blame for unpopular
decisions that may jeopardize their stays in office.2 6 By failing to provide this check
in the context of administrative preemption, Congress has defeated the constitutional
mandates of representative democracy and federalism.3
7
Many theories attribute congressional accountability to the decisions of adminis-
trative agencies,23' and at the foundation of each is the assumption that Congress can
eradicate the issue of accountability simply by taking care in the drafting of
230. See Mcgreal, supra note 58, at 851 (indicating that federalism is enforced through the itates' influence
in Congress only when Congress uses clear and deliberate language when preempting state law); see also Wolfson,
supra note 41, at 113-14 (explaining that the clear congressional intent standard acts to protect federalism).
231. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to
Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577, 624-26 (1985) (referring to Justice Blackmun's
argument that states' sovereign interests are protected and congressional overreaching is limited by the "structure"
of the national government and "state participation in federal governmental action.").
232. See Handman, supra note 110, at 212-13 (stating that political accountability functions as a check to
ensure rights-protective government policy); see also Wolfson, supra note 41, at 112 ("[Ihe courts can...
simultaneously protect the political safeguards of federalism and afford the necessary deference to Congress by
requiring that Congress speak clearly and explicitly whenever it preempts state legislation .... ).
233. See Handman, supra note 110, at 212 (arguing that the principles underlying political accountability
should apply in the context of congressional delegations because core constitutional values are implicated); see also
Wolfson, supra note 41, at 110 (stating that states' reliance on political safeguards when Congress legislates are
applicable to administrative agencies because of their prominent role in'regulation today).
234. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 100 (analyzing whether agency lawmaking is made politically
accountable through congressional oversight).
235. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 100.
236. See Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 1l, at 16 (stating that manipulation of voter perception is
one of the main reasons Congress delegates); see also KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220 (listing reelection as one of
a representative's main objectives).
237. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 114 (concluding that within the context of administrative preemption
Congress has been able to exercise power almost certainly denied it by the Framers and administrative agencies
have been able to circumvent the political safeguards of federalism).
238. See infra notes 244-81 and accompanying text (discussing theories of congressional accountability for
the decisions of administrative agencies).
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statutes.3 9 Legislators are capable of writing precise and complete legislation, so that
no rules are necessary to achieve the purpose of the statute.240 But this is hardly ever
done, due to conflicting interests, time constraints, and a refusal to take responsibility
for lawmaking.24 Instead, advocates of delegation contend that Congress implements
the numerous direct and indirect oversight techniques available to it, and thereby
legitimizes administrative agency power.? z
1. Statutory Controls
The primary method to ensure accountability of those agency staffers who write
rules is for Congress to restrict their discretion by placing specific guidelines on the
rule-making process 43 These include procedures for public participation, certain
types of mandatory analysis for decisions, and specifically identifiable standards.2"
By creating this type of interactional relationship, the public can locate a politically
accountable decision-maker more easily.
Each additional procedure restricts freedom in administrative rule-making by
making the designated agency take into consideration certain information in creating
the substance of a rule.245 However, there is little evidence this procedure works on
a regular basis.24 Even congressionally enacted procedural requirements, as well as
the loose provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,"s are often not observed
by agencies.248 Thus when procedures are implemented to shape rule-making a
239. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 216.
240. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 216.
241. See Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 16-17 (explaining that Congress has enough time to
make rules binding on private conduct but it would rather not take responsibility for divisive policy choices); see
discussion infra Part VI.C.2.
242. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99; see KERWIN, supra note 228, at 217 (stating that Congress has
numerous direct and indirect oversight techniques at its disposal).
243. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99.
244. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 99.
245. ScHOENBROD. supra note 107, at 99.
246. ScHoENBROD, supra note 107, at 99.
247. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997). The Administrative Procedure Act
provides that agency nrle-making at a minimum be preceded by notice in the Federal Register and by consideration
of public commentary on the agency's proposal. Id. at § 553(b), (c). Agency adjudications that are to be conducted
"on the record" are subject to trial-type procedural requirements, such as an impartial hearing examiner, a right to
bring counsel, an opportunity to bring witnesses and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, preparation of a hearing
transcript, and the like. Id. at § 554(a). By specifying these degrees of required formality or by including additional
requirements in an agency's authorizing statute, Congress can use procedural requirements to influence agency
action. However, such restrictions have fallen on hard times because agencies are frequently turning to
unreviewable forms of policy-making. See id. at § 553(b)(A)-(d)(2) (listing interpretive rules and statements of
policy as exempt from APA procedural requirements). In addition, courts are refusing to impose any procedural
requirements on agencies beyond those laid out in the Constitution, the APA, or the agency's organic statute. See,
e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDRC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
248. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 217.
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certain way, the task of creating a link between administrative agencies and
accountable legislators is not necessarily accomplished 4 9
The power of money functions as another potential mechanism of accountability
available to Congress. S Budgets can reflect rule-making projects that members of
Congress support, or penalize those agencies which do not provide the types of rules
that were expected of them.2' Theoretically, this would serve as a good indicator to
the public of which members of Congress favor agencies or agency rules, but there
is no real evidence suggesting favoritism in Congress's expenditures.252 Thus, while
the power of appropriating funds may sometimes be used to influence agency rule-
making, "congressional control of regulatory policy through the budget tends to be
sporadic and very particularized.' z 3 Although this process potentially acts as an
effective means of control, there are no solid assurances that Congress exercises this
power in any significant way.2
At the core of most suspect mechanisms is the fact that the silent agenda of
Congress, to remain uncontroversial, collides with the theory of congressional
accountability for administrative rule-making.z 5 This friction is consistently
exemplified by statutes and procedural complexity that purposely make it very
difficult to determine which interests Congress is seeking to protect or advance. 6
At the center of these types of broad, confusing statutes is the fact that members of
Congress, by acting ambiguously, can deny responsibility for agency decisions that
might disappoint the expectations of their voters. 
7
249. KERw N, supra not6228, at 217-18.
250. KERWiN, supra note 228, at 219.
251. KERwIN, supra note 228, at 219.
252. KERwIN, supra note 228, at 219.
253. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLuM. L. REv. 452,508 (1989); Frederick Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives
to the "Legislative Veto," 32 ADMIN. L. Rev. 667, 687-89, 710 (1980). Abner 3. Mikva, formerly a judge and a
congressman, proposes that the budget power is too powerful to be an effective control mechanism: "Congress must
destroy a regulatory regime to control it. The power of the purse is a very blunt tool at best. It can halt agency
action, but only at a high price." Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of Judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 115,
120 (1986).
254. KERWrN, supra note 228, at 220 (questioning the effectiveness of the budget process as a mechanism
of accountability).
255. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 102 (illustrating the difficulties that face the public when it tries
to hold Congress accountable for agency actions due to the legislators' ability to accede to controversial law without
assuming responsibility for creating it).
256. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text (depicting as an example the circumstances surrounding
the 1988-89 congressional pay-raise controversy).
257. See infra notes 282-90 and accompanying text (describing the advantages gained by Congress by mani-
pulating voters' perceptions).
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2. Principal-Agent Theory
The principal-agent theory of legislative-bureaucratic relations rests on the model
that the principals are the elected officials in Congress; their agents are the
administrative bureaucrats who supposedly carry-out their wishes.38 This theory
acknowledges the different goals of each body and the tools at their disposal to put
them into effect.2 9 The primary goal of elected representatives is to stay in office and
make policy that reflects the ideals of their constituency.m° Therefore, in order to
accomplish these tasks, they must provide for their constituents and avoid the blame
when they fail to do so.6' Agency staffers have a more diverse agenda, varying bet-
ween objectives such as work-avoidance, responding to outside pressure, or pursuing
personal policy-making. 26 Thus, the theory of principal-agent rests on how well the
principal is able to control the agent amidst seemingly irreconcilable goals 6 3
Some commentators argue that the statutory controls and procedures influence
this relationship, as well as different degrees of congressional oversight.2" However,
as discussed earlier, statutory controls and procedures are not indicative of con-
straint,2 5 and, later in this paper, I will illustrate that the reliance on congressional
oversight as a basic check is misplaced?6 There is no clear answer indicating that
Congress plays a significant role in the oversight relationship. 7 Practically speaking,
although those who write rules may be influenced by Congress, absent agents faithful
to legislators, there is no meaningful control mechanism on rule-makers
61
3. Oversight of Rule-making Performance
The last broad categorical theory of Congressional accountability to
administrative agencies is the extent to which Congress oversees rule-making per-
formance. In this context, there are several ways that Congress provides a check on
agency regulations.
258. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220.
259. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220.
260. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220.
261. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220.
262. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220.
263. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 220.
264. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 221.
265. See supra notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 282-315 and accompanying text.
267. KERWIN, supra note 228, at 221.
268. See KERWIN, supra note 228, at 221 (predicating the effectiveness of the principal.agent theory of
accountability on the extent to which bureaucrats are influenced and faithful agents of the legislators).
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Congress can always revoke or narrow the authority it has granted through
subsequent legislation; however, this might not be a practical method of patrolling
rule-making agencies.m
There are also statutory devices available to Congress, but the most prominent,
the legislative veto, no longer exists. ° This device had directed agencies to transmit
final administrative rules to Congress for review before they became effective. 27t The
legislative veto was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983 in the case of
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha?72 The Court, in Chadha, con-
cluded that the legislative veto violated the Presentment Clause of Article I,
273
because the resolution used to invoke the veto was not presented to the President for
his signature. 274 A legislative veto implemented by a one-house resolution was
additionally held unconstitutional, because it violated the bicameral provision275 of
the Constitution.276 The legislative veto was also perceived to be unconstitutional
because it violated the principle of separation of powers by allowing Congress to
intrude too far into executive branch activities. 277 Thus, a method which once served
as a key means for accountability through congressional oversight no longer remains
a constitutional alternative.
2 78
Finally, congressional oversight hearings by special committees can influence
agency staffers by subjecting them to harassment and embarrassment as the hearing
committee demands the agency's explanation of a proposed or final rule 9 In this
way, administrative personnel can at least temporarily be persuaded to comply with
the wishes of the relevant oversight committee. ° However, these types of informal
control mechanisms tend to represent the views of the individual legislators parti-
cipating in the oversight hearing, and are neither a practical nor constitutional
equivalent to clear policy direction by Congress?"
269. See infra notes 304-15 and accompanying text (illustrating the impracticality of overriding agency rule-
making due to both supermajority provisions and political obstacles within the Senate and the House).
270. See Smith, supra note 107. at 329 (explaining the repercussions from the loss of the legislative veto).
271. Smith, supra note 107, at 329.
272. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States ... .
274. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59.
275. U.S. CONST. art I. §§ 1, 7 (requiring both the House of Representatives and the Senate to pass a bill
before it can become law).
276. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958.
277. Id. at 956-58.
278. Id.'
279. Farina, supra note 253, at 509.
280. See Farina, supra note 253, at 509 (stating that subjecting agency staffers to sufficient harassment makes
them at least temporarily "come[] to heel").
281. Farina, supra note 253, at 509-10.
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C. The Realities of Administrative Accountability Through Congress
1. Blurring Accountability
Although many checks and balances seem to be in place to make administrative
rule-makers accountable through congressional oversight, one of the main reasons
members of Congress delegate is to manipulate voter perception by blurring
accountability for their actions. 2 Delegation allows legislators to represent their
support for an action to those constituents in favor of it, and as opposing the same
action to others. 3 While the notion of accountability in congressional lawmaking
requires the majority to take direct responsibility for a law, there is no such link when
Congress delegates the power to make rules to an administrative agency.2 Article
I of the Constitution requires "the Yeas and Nays of the members of either house...
be entered on the Journal." 5 Through this record-taking it is easy to discern who is
responsible for unpopular decisions by Congress.2 In contrast, the oversight notion
of accountability allows Congress to sustain agency law by inaction, enabling
accession to controversial law without suffering negative consequences.!
Obscuring responsibility is sometimes useful for reelection and always useful to
deflate animosity created by unpopular decision-making.2 Without the power to
delegate, legislators have to record their vote for the statutory laws and open them-
selves up to attack by their rivals. 9 This vulnerability becomes avoidable when
Congress does not make the law, but instead delegates its lawmaking authority to less
accountable agencies.2 °
The notion that legislators have a tendency to cover their tracks through
delegation illustrates the friction between the theory that administrative agencies are
accountable through Congress, and the reality that members of Congress want to
282. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note Ill, at 16; SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 102-03.
283. See Marra, supra note 111, at 785 (stating that through delegation Congress is able to detach itself from
politically unpopular decision-making); see also Thomas Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals
of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419,430 (1987) (discussing the ability of Congress to appear to
respond to whatever constituent interests support the legislation while at the same time distancing itself from
unpopular policies implemented by agencies).
284. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 102.
285. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3.
286. See SCHOENDROD, supra note 107, at 102 (indicating that controversial law can only take effect if a
sufficient number of legislators support it on the record).
287. ScHoENBROD, supra note 107, at 102.
288. See Handman, supra note 110, at 212 (explaining that when Congress can insulate itself from divisive
policy decisions and avoid public scrutiny it is more likely to sustain majority votes); see also SCHOENDROD, supra
note 107, at 102 (stating that the oversight notion of accountability allows Congress to accede to agency law
through inaction, thus avoiding any repercussions associated with taking a stance on controversial legislation).
289. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 102.
290. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 102.
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avoid accountability for their decisions?'t A good example of the typical penchant
for covering up their tracks was epitomized by the congressional pay-raise con-
troversy of 19 88 -89 .2 Congress passed legislation delegating to the Commission on
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries the ability to set the pay of the members
of Congress and other officials, such as federal judges, whose pay was linked to their
own.293 Congress attempted, through this use of delegation, to give its members a
fifty percent pay raise without losing votes in the following election from con-
stituents who did not agree with this allocation of taxpayer money.2' A condition of
this specific legislation was that if the commission was to grant a pay increase, only
a statute passed before the increase went into effect could counteract the increase.295
Therefore, when the commission recommended a fifty percent increase in pay, some
members introduced bills to cancel it.2 However, this was only a guise in which key
members of Congress would prevent a vote on the bills designed to stop the pay-raise
until it was too late.297 Thus, legislators could suggest to their constituents that they
were against the pay raise, in fact even as having recorded their opposition to it.298
But, the reality was that, through delegation and blurring the public's perception of
accountability, members of Congress could reap the benefit of a pay raise while
receiving credit for opposing it.29 Although this specific legislation was foiled due
to public outrage and protest, it is a vivid example of the extreme manipulation that
can be effectuated on the public through delegation of power to administrative rule-
makers. 300
The problem with the lack of political accountability by agency staffers is neither
theoretical nor a reflection of poor values in our nation's legislators. Rather, it is a
problem with our system. If one of the greatest sources of accountability for
administrative lawmakers is supposed to be linked with congressional monitoring
and oversight, then the chain is not secure. Congress cannot intend both to blur
accountability through delegation, and intend to be a responsible monitor over the
agencies.3  It is not possible to do both. By delegating an enormous amount of
291. See Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 11, at 16 (stating that Congress does not delegate to ease
its workload or to avoid addressing issues of broad public concern, but primarily to manipulate voter perceptions).
292. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note Ill, at 16; see, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 11-12
(describing the congressional pay-raise controversy).
293. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at7l.
294. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 11I, at 71.
295. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 71.
296. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note i11, at 71.
297. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 71.
298. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 71.
299. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 11, at 71.
300. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 71; see, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v.
Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984) (avoiding the use of preemptive language in the
Agricultural Fair Practices Act suggested that Congress had attempted to "hoodwink" lobbyists by purposely
obscuring whether the federal statute was or was not the final word on the matter).
301. See supra notes 282-300 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's ability to blur its accountability
for divisive legislation).
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lawmaking responsibility to the agency staffers who write regulations, Congress has
effectively empowered government employees, who are seldom affected by those
rules, to formulate policy." Meanwhile Congress enjoys the credit for dealing with
tough problems, but by not actually voting on unpopular legislation, does not suffer
any detrimental consequences °3 In the end, Congress is content, and the American
people do not know who to blame when agencies enact powerful rules that directly
affect their livelihood.
2. Congress Does Not Override Agency Law
Once an agency makes a law, Congress seldom will repeal it even if it embodies
policy that would have never been enacted by Congress.? Although proponents of
administrative rule-making legitimize the practice by stressing that Congress always
retains the power to rescind or modify an agency's decisions, this concept is pre-
dominately theoretical 05
In practice, the process operates as follows: initially broad authority is ceded to
an agency; the regulation promulgated is then law unless new legislation by Congress
overrides it.3 6 The current procedure evinces a clear bias toward regulation, since
what amounts to a large burden is on Congress to alter the status quo.3°7 Even if an
agency enacts a rule against the wishes of the relevant subcommittee and declines to
rescind it, the subcommittee is likely to fail in an attempt to promulgate a statute
nullifying the agency action. °
Since Presidential appointees, as heads of administrative agencies, have endorsed
the regulation, there is a presumption that the President supports it as well.
3°9
Therefore, in order for the Legislature to override the regulation, it may well take a
two-thirds majority in both houses.10 In addition, even more problematic is the fact
that those in favor of a statutory override must sometimes overcome substantial
302. See Smith, supra note 107, at 325 (pointing out the fact that regulations are laws and govern the lives
of people the same as statutes).
303. See supra notes 282-300 and accompanying text (describing Congress's ability to blur its accountability
for divisive legislation); see also Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382 (stating that "[b]y forcing state governments to absorb
the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, members of Congress can take credit for
'solving' problems without have to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.").
304. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 101.
305. See Smith, supra note 107, at 326 (describing the practice of administrative rule-making as ceding much
authority to agencies).
306. Smith, supra note 107, at 326.
307. Smith, supra note 107, at 326.
308. SCHOENBRODSUpra note 107, at 101.
309. Smith, supra note 107, at 326.
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 ("Every Order Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives .... ").
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obstacles to getting the bill to the floor in the House and Senate."' As Congressman
Nick Smith (R.-Mich.) acknowledged:
[P]ractically speaking, only regulations that are so flawed that they attract
substantial attention or that offend senior members of Congress are likely to
command the floor time and general legislative effort needed to enact a
statute."2
In essence, the Constitution has operated through Article I's supermajoritarian re-
quirement so as to insulate agency action from oversight.
31 3
If one of the foundations for direct accountability to a representative democracy
lies in Congress's ability to enact new legislation and exert power over administrative
rule-making, this protection seems misplaced. 4 Even if theoretically sound,
government practice hardly ever mimics this theory. In this situation, practicality
points out that Congress's direct power to counter administrative agency rules,
making it the responsible watchdogs, does not hold true to form.315 Once again, the
national constituency lacks an outlet for their discontent because, as far as they know,
their congressional representatives were not a party to the implementation of the
burdensome legislation.
3. Addressing the Problem
The majority of the 104!h Congress understood that it needed to do more to
monitor administrative rule-making? 6 This concern for a system of government,
seemingly unchecked by traditional constitutional constraints, was embodied in a
series of bills aimed at curbing this process.31 7 Representative Nick Smith (R.-Mich.)
introduced a bill on February 28, 1996, the "Significant Regulation Oversight Act of
1996, ' 318 that would have required "significant new rules to be affirmatively
311. Smith, supra note 107, at 326.
312. Smith, supra note 107, at 326.
313. SCHOENBROD, supra note 107, at 101.
314. See supra notes 304-13 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with overriding agency law).
315. See supra notes 304-13 and accompanying text (illustrating the constitutional obstacles that prevent
Congress from overriding agency law).
316. Smith, supra note 107, at 323; see Rogelio Garcia, Cong. Res. Serv. Issue Brief 1B95035, Federal
Regulatory Reform Summary (1995) ("[Republicans] introduced bills designed to minimize costly and onerous
regulations.'). The Republican majority of the House was elected upon a platform entitled Contract with America
[hereinafter the Contract]. Signed by 367 of the 421 Republican House candidates, the Contract contained 10
legislative initiatives upon which Republicans guaranteed the full House would vote upon during the first hundred
days of the 104' Congress. See NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WrrH AMERICA 6-12 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994).
317. See infra notes 318-43 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of the "Significant Regulation
Oversight Act of 1996" and the provisions of the "Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995").
318. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996).
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approved by both houses of Congress before going into effect., 319 The bill defined
a "significant rule" as "any rule proposed by an agency that is specified or described
as such in the Act that authorizes the rule.''32° Thus, under this proposed statute, the
members of Congress, enacting the initial statute providing for regulation by an
administrative agency, would determine which rules were considered "significant." 32
1
Ultimately, Congress would make the initial and final determination as to which type
of rules could be promulgated by agencies through the processes outlined in the
Administrative Procedure Act, and which rules could only be passed by a legislative
act of Congress. 322 In the case of "significant" regulations, the agency would have to
send a drafted proposal of the rules to Congress for approval.32
The "Significant Regulation Oversight Act" also included provisions for both
revoking and revising rules passed prior to its enactment?24 The bill outlined a
procedure whereby "[a] petition to change or repeal such a regulation would be
accepted when signed by 30 senators or 120 members of the House of
Representatives. ''32 This type of petition would require the Majority Leader to intro-
duce ajoint resolution revising or repealing prior regulations. 326This provision would
allow members of Congress who favor reform of regulations to "force floor votes on
controversial regulation., 327 Thus, where once substantial obstacles stood in the way
of overriding agency rule-making, through this provision "a minority of reformers
in either house could force their colleagues to take publicly recorded stands on issues
that they might prefer'to duck."328
Overall, Nick Smith's proposed bill takes great strides to legitimize rule-making
by making the lawmakers in Congress, who are politically accountable, responsible
for significant decisions that affect personal liberties and state autonomy.3 29
Representative Smith proclaimed that "[b]y placing the regulatory power once more
into the hands of officials that ordinary citizens could speak with, influence, and vote
for, those citizens would retain more control over their lives. 330 In other proposed
legislation aimed to reform the agency regulators, Representative J.D. Hayworth (R.-
Ariz.), Chairman of the House Constitutional Caucus, introduced the "Congressional
Responsibility Act of 1995. '331 In contrast to Smith's bill, the Hayworth bill was
319. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 4 (1996); Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 82.
320. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996).
321. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 20.
322. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 11, at 20.
323. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 4 (1996); Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 82.
324. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
325. fd.; Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 11, at 82.
326. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
327. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 11, at 82.
328. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 1, at 82.
329. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 11, at 82.
330. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 82.
331. H.R. 2727, 104(h Cong. § 1 (1995).
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much more sweeping, leaving almost nothing to the agencies' discretion. 32 The
purpose of this Act was to end Congress's practice of delegating "responsibility for
making regulations to unelected, unaccountable officials of the executive branch" and
instead to "require[] that regulations proposed by agencies of the executive branch
be affirmatively enacted by Congress before they become effective. 3 3 The only
regulations that the "Congressional Responsibility Act" would leave within the sole
discretion of administrative agencies are "regulations pertaining to agency organi-
zation, personnel, and the like."334
The Hayworth bill would operate so that agencies must submit proposed
regulations to Congress, whereupon the Majority Leader of each House would
introduce a bill to enact the proposed regulation.335 Under the procedures outlined in
the "Congressional Responsibility Act," any member of a respective house could
move to consider the regulations, the bill would be unamenable, and the debate
would be limited to one hour.336 These bills proposing new regulations would have
to be voted on within sixty days from their date of introduction, with the only
exception being that a majority of each house could vote to suspend the "fast track,"
in which case the bill would be considered in the same way as other bills. 37
Representative Hayworth's bill represents the efforts taken by some members of
Congress to curb the constitutional crisis that has grown in proportion to the
unrestrained delegations of authority to administrative agencies.3 38 While the Smith
bill would allow congressional discretion when to delegate by deciding initially
which regulations are "significant," the "Congressional Responsibility Act" would
put anything that could be construed as lawmaking power back into the hands of the
elected and accountable members of Congress
39
The Hayworth bill is a more extreme proposal than the Smith bill, and presents
a few concerns that likely make the Smith bill more desirable." Under
Representative Hayworth's proposed legislation, delegations that occurred before its
enactment are not affected; thus it would not have the same effect on the "tyranny of
the status quo" that the Smith bill addresses by proposing a mechanism to repeal or
revoke prior regulations.341 Also, while the Hayworth proposal abolishes con-
gressional delegations to administrative agencies, Smith's bill recognizes the political
benefits of delegation by only necessitating congressional review of "significant"
332. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 20.
333. H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
334. H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995); Testimony of Jerry Taylor. supra note 111, at 21.
335. H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
336. H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
337. Id.
338. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 11, at 21.
339. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 21.
340. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 21.
341. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996); H.R. 2727. 104th Cong. § 6 (1995); Testimony of Jerry Taylor,
supra note 111, at 21.
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regulations promulgated by administrative agencies.' 2 Although the "Significant
Regulation Oversight Act" may be more acceptable to those who favor delegations,
overall both the Smith and Hayworth bills represent significant attempts to reaffirm
lawmaking as an Article I power, specifically granted by the Constitution to elected
representatives.'
The problem of unaccountable decision-making in delegation has not only been
addressed by lawmakers but has drawn the attention of some of our most influential
jurists. In a lecture given by then Judge and future Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer in 1983, the year the legislative veto was declared unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha,1 he presented a plan for a "veto substitute" that would allow Congress to
retain control of the law, while following the criteria of Chadha. 45 Breyer's proposal
would have replaced the legislative veto with statutory language making "the
agency's exercise of the authority to which the veto is attached... ineffective unless
Congress enacts a confirmatory law within say, sixty days." Under this proposal,
the executive would be relieved of its lawmaking power because, while the agencies
would recommend specific regulations, their proposed rules "would not have the
effect of law until they passed the normal constitutional channels."347 Thus, Breyer's
scheme would allow Congress to follow the mandate of Chadha, while still retaining
the power of a veto provision.M" Under this plan, if one House disagrees with a
regulation created by an administrative agency, it can essentially veto it.349 However,
with the confirmatory law requirement in Breyer's plan, "[t]he veto substitute
imposes on Congress a degree of visible responsibility for the actions it confirms, a
burden that the veto system allows it to avoid."350 This provides both a check on
administrative agency rule-making, as well as accountable elected officials who are
responsible to their constituencies? 5
Congress and the judiciary are obviously concerned about the broad discretion
and lack of control over administrative rule-makers. Without the proper constraints,
there is no constitutionally mandated check on the agencies? 52 In the arena of
342. H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996); H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995); Testimony of Jerry Taylor,
supra note 111, at 21.
343. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 21.
344. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
345. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note Il1, at 19; see supra notes 270-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the abolition of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha).
346. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I 1, at 19.
347. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 19.
348. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note Il1, at 19.
349. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 11, at 19.
350. Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note I ll, at 19.
351. See Testimony of Jerry Taylor, supra note 111, at 19 (stating that under the Breyer proposal requiring
a confirmatory law by members of Congress, the political dynamic of delegation would change considerably by
making Congress visibly responsible for agency regulations).
352. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at I 10 (drawing the parallelism that because federalism checks are neces-
sary for the legitimacy of congressional action they are just as necessary for the legitimacy of agency actions).
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administrative preemption, the only guardian of unrestrained interference into
traditional state domains are the built-in checks of our federalist system. 53 These
checks are best represented by removing those responsible for poor policy decisions.
When accountability is lost through delegation, the safeguard is removed, and the
federal government tips the scales of federalism into its favor in unconstitutional
proportions.
VII. CONCLUSION
A necessary premise to our system of federalism is the notion that administrative
rule-making must somehow be accountable to the American people in order to
preserve a constitutionally mandated balance in the area of preemption?4 Two
realities exist in the field of administrative rule-making that fall to support this
absolute foundation. First, Congress has a tendency to blur its accountability for
agency regulations by insulating itself from public record and unfavorable agency
policy decisions.3 55 Therefore, it is not logical to say that staffers and unelected
bureaucrats are in any substantial way accountable through Congress, where
Congress itself constantly attempts to sever any ties between the two. 56 Secondly,
the theory that agency decisions are made to be politically accountable by direct
congressional review and reaction is not valid. 35 Practically speaking, Congress itself
is impeded by both constitutional supermajority provisions and other political
constraints within each house from serving this function, even assuming any
unsubstantiated willingness to do so.35 A logical progression leads to the conclusion
that agency staffers make decisions and policy choices insulated from the political
process because they are, at most, only tentatively accountable through Congress to
the national constituency. The truth of this assertion is reflected in the recent and
growing concern among the elected legislators, as reflected by the bills proposing to
counteract this unchecked lawmaking.359
The concern central to this discussion is the precarious effect this type of
decision-making has on the safeguards to our federal system when administrative
agencies seek to preempt in areas occupied by the states. There is no context where
the states are more vulnerable to an overreaching federal government than when
353. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 97 (reiterating the holding in Garcia mandating that the proper
safeguards of federalism are established in the political branches of government through the states' representation
in the Senate).
354. See KERWiN, supra note 228, at 215 ("Holding those who write rules accountable for the decisions they
make and the manner in which they make them is critical to the maintenance of our democracy.").
355. See discussion supra Part VI.C.1.
356. See discussion supra Part VI.C.l.
357. See discussion supra Part VLC.2.
358. See discussion supra Part VI.C.2.
359. See supra notes 316-43 and accompanying text.
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Congress displaces state law.36 Garcia dictated that states are protected by the
checks inherent in the federal system of a democratic government.3 6' Accountable
legislators must answer to their constituents for all policy decisions. 6 2 Logically,
administrative preemption must be governed by the same ideals.363 But, that situation
only points to a lack of accountability, because Congress does not or cannot properly
exercise the oversight with the mechanisms presently available to it?64 Adminis-
trative rule-making sidesteps the sole protections that the judiciary in Garcia, and the
Constitution in its clearly defined federal and state spheres of authority, made
available to the states. 65 Without these protections, the authority to delegate
preemptive power threatens to defy federalism and the basic tenets of representative
government.3 Therefore, the ability of Congress to delegate in the area of pre-
emption, an already tenuous proposition, should be closely scrutinized not only by
the substance of the delegation, but, more importantly, as to whether the initial act
is in accordance with the constitutional scheme.367 In order to restore equilibrium
between the states and federal government, Congress should reaffirm itself as the
arbiter of the federal-state balance of power by bearing the responsibility of drafting
significant preemptive legislation, rather than delegating that task to administrative
agencies. Concomitantly, if Congress fails to legislate with requisite clarity, or if
Congress delegates the job of preemption to administrative agencies, the courts
should not presume that preemption was intended absent clear language indicating
a congressional attempt to preempt.
360. See Mcgreal, supra note 58, at 823-24 (preempting state law tips the federal-state balance heavily in
favor of the federal government).
361. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
362. See LaPierre, supra note 231, at 646 ("[W]hen the political checks are effective, congressional political
decisions satisfy the fundamental principle that those with the power to make decisions should bear, to the fullest
extent possible, the costs and benefits and the credit and blame for their decisions.").
363. See Handman, supra note 10, at 212 (stating that "logic offers no reasons why the same principles"
that apply to congressional accountability should not apply "where Congress has implemented... innovative
measures to bypass public scrutiny in contexts that implicate core constitutional values").
364. See supra notes 238-315 and accompanying text.
365. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
366. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 114 (arguing that administrative agencies have been able to avoid the
political safeguards of federalism).
367. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 72 (establishing the thesis that "courts should view preemption invoked
by administrative agencies more critically").
